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TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AS SOCIAL PROCESS • 
A SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE
Ida R. Hoos
Research Sociologist
Space Sciences Laboratory
University of California, Berkeley
ABSTRACT
Technology transfer is the process by which important scien­ 
tific and technological advance is translated into socially- 
defined "benefits." Seen in this perspective, technology 
transfer may be regarded as the way the United States invests 
in the future, its own and that of other nations. With the 
President's current scientific priority list heavily studded 
with space-derived items, and the White House Fact Sheet on 
Space Policy's strong emphasis on application, the mandate 
is unmistakable. How it can best be implemented is not so 
certain. Even viewed in retrospect, most known innovations 
travel a tortuous road. In prospect, the path is almost com­ 
pletely unpredictable. What is clear is that there must be ex­ 
plicit recognition that technology transfer is in essence a 
social process, that it does not take place by itself, and that 
it occurs in a social environment, in which "success," how­ 
ever defined, depends on a complicated web of synergistic 
factors only tangentially related to the technology itself.
The notion of technology transfer is at least as old as fire and 
certainly as commonplace as the adoption of the wheel. This 
familiarity with the concept has probably contributed to the 
tendency toward underestimating its complexity. NASA's 
considerable experience with technological innovation and 
the dynamics of transferring space-derived knowledge and 
knowhow into terrestrial and perhaps more pedestrian 
channels serves as the basis for this paper. With Landsat the 
primary, but not the only, example, we analyze from the 
sociological perspective the factors implementing and imped­ 
ing technology transfer.
REPORT
A retrospective review of the terms that have recurred with 
high frequency in federal policy over the past half century 
would indicate the persistence of the idea of technology 
transfer. Although the name has changed and the social con­ 
text, such as war or peace, depression or prosperity, has 
determined form and focus, the notion has nonetheless pre­ 
vailed that scientific and technological advance spell oppor­
tunity. The challenge has been, then, to take advantage of 
that opportunity, i.e. to make that opportunity materialize. 
But our nostalgic exercise would soon show us that the 
history of innovations and their dissemination, adaptation, 
and adoption show more serendipity than "savvy/ that 
chance played an important part, and that there was as much 
error as trial in their road to success. Moreover, many of the 
inventions that we now credit as revolutionary became im­ 
portant only in their mutations and were given little recog­ 
nition when they first appeared.
The important lesson that we can learn from history is that 
technology transfer must be viewed as a social process in 
the realistic perspective of its point in time. This is par­ 
ticularly necessary for us because of the characteristics of 
our own time-frame. Such an approach forces us to disen­ 
cumber ourselves of the homespun homilies and comfortable 
cliches that dominate our thinking. Instead, we mustexamine 
in their present social dimensions the conceptions and per­ 
ceptions bearing on technology transfer. Because we live in 
the Space Age, we must take into account the ways in which 
our peculiar ethos and expectations affect the process. This, 
first of all, brings us immediately face to face with a number 
of paradoxes, important, because they illustrate the extent 
to which we are victims of "future shock."*
While, on the one hand, we cling to the belief that "necessity 
is the mother of invention," we expect technological advance 
that is far ahead of our adaptive capability to have instant 
and visible pay-off. This now-orientation places an inordinate 
burden on technologies to demonstrate their benefits pre­ 
maturely, even before they have had a chance to develop 
fully. One of the reasons for the high expectations is the 
series of space spectaculars that gave the impression of "look 
Ma - no hands." Everything appeared so smooth and simple: 
someone twiddled a dial in Houston and men orbited the 
earth, walked in space, and landed on the moon. Someone 
pushed a button and a signal from Voyager I 400 million 
miles into space detonated an explosion at Hutchison Junior
* Alvin Toffler, Future Shock, New York, Bantam Books, 
1971.
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College in Kansas. The combination of ease and perfection 
encouraged a kind of can-do complex, in a form known as 
the technological fix. The cliche that emerged became a 
rallying cry, "A nation that can put a man on the moon 
can ......." And any wishful thinker could supply his own
missing words.
Dangled before Congress and the public was the tantalizing 
promise of the benefits to be derived from space exploration. 
If technological transfer could be seen as imbued with apple- 
pie-and-motherhood, then space technology transfer could be 
regarded as apple-pie-in-the-sky-and-motherhood. Hence, the 
enticements in the form of "spinoff", which have ranged 
from such bucolic benefits as pig pregnancy detectors to 
satellite power systems to deliver the sun's bounty to an 
energy-hungry world. And inspirational literature (and 
speeches) pointed out the benefits for everyone, including 
the Third World. All of this has put a special burden on 
NASA, for to meet the expectations that have been raised 
would require the services of a Rumpelstiltskin. Lacking 
assistance from this magical monster, NASA tries to carry 
out its mandate amid misconceptions that have boomeranged 
and conceptions that have missed their mark. And, hoisted 
with its own petard, it often does not get credit for some of 
its outstanding contributions.
A basic misconception stems from the nature of the tech­ 
nology to be transferred. Here, space technology operates 
under a handicap because of the oversell by apologists who 
have satisfied the requirement for a favorable cost/benefit 
ratio by roseate promises. The image of the cornucopia ready 
to pour forth its usufruct is unfortunate, for it is at this point 
that the apple-pie-in-the-sky syndrome and the look-Ma-no- 
hands notion collide. The facile intimations that there are 
beneficial items up there and that they can be readily put to 
use down here are detrimental to the very effort they are 
.intended to support. U. S. space policy calls for application 
but little explicit recognition is made of the fact that to 
transmute space-derived technology into forms responsive to 
terrestrial needs is a complicated, customized task which in­ 
volves concerted action by many agencies and levels of gov­ 
ernment and the private sector as well. And, although official 
statements out of NASA acknowledge that technology trans­ 
fer does not happen by itself/ the message loses something 
in its translation through budgetary allocations into organ­ 
izational terms. In fact, observation of the apportionment of 
funds reminds one of Anthony Downs' famous recipe for 
horse-and-rabbit stew, with support for the transfer process 
the rabbit.
Another misconception particularly damaging to the appli­ 
cation of space-derived technology is created by the almost- 
superstitious belief that necessity is the mother of invention. 
Besides encouraging a passivity inimical to the idea of inno­ 
vation, this anachronistic adage fails to reflect the scope and 
pace of modern technological advance. Perceived need, once
* cf . Technology Utilization At Work and other publications, 
which start off with the sentence, "Aerospace spinoffs rare­ 
ly occur automatically."
regarded as a prerequisite for n*ew technology, may actually 
be a result of its use. That invention may, in some circum­ 
stances, be the mother of necessity has been amply demon­ 
strated in developments surrounding the electronic computer. 
Similarly, access to and application of Landsat data, for ex­ 
ample, might help resource agencies define their needs and 
refine their models. The capability of achieving a particular 
objective itself becomes an important incentive.
Underlying some of the misconceptions is the macho-chism 
of the man-on-the-moon. There still persists the notion that 
the techniques used by McNamara for managing the Depart­ 
ment of Defense and credited for accomplishing the various 
space missions could be applied in the social arena as well.* 
Known to have been successfully utilized in the management 
of complex systems, systems analysis, with its components 
and companions, cost/benefit analysis, fault-tree/event-tree 
analysis, and the like, became entrenched as TRW, i.e. the 
Right Way, to approach social "Systems", the logic being 
that they, too, were systems and large and complex. The 
result is best described in the statement by Maslow**: "If the 
only tool you have is a hammer, you tend to treat everything 
as if it were a nail." The tools have come to dominate public 
decision-making largely because they carry the irresistible 
appeal of "logic" and "rationality;" both highly valued con­ 
cepts in our Technological Era. While NASA sometimes re­ 
ceives credit for systems techniques as one of its spin-off 
items, it always pays a price. To begin with, it is required, 
perhaps even more than the service-oriented agencies, to pro­ 
duce justification, on the basis of the cost/benefit ratio, not 
only for its own existence vis-a-vis other federal agencies in 
the national budget but also for many of its own internal 
programs.
This has resulted in a curious anomaly. There has been, on 
the one hand, the need to justify the long-range plans that a 
space agency must make, but the time-and-money con­ 
straints of the budgeting cycle have had to be respected. 
There is, besides, the need to convince Congress of the pay­ 
off in terms it can understand and accept. And this is where 
another homely adage causes a problem. Schooled to believe 
that "the proof of the pudding is in the eating," we are in­ 
clined to expect a tangible product, whereas thanks to future 
shock, or whatever accounts for the drag, we might not 
recognize a pudding when we saw it and would not know 
how to eat it if we did!
How one can realistically put a dollar sign on the returns 
from innovations where potential has barely been tapped is a 
mystery known only to model-makers faced with a do-or-die 
assignment. Quantifying pie-in-the-sky is no easier than de­ 
livering it! When, as is the situation with Landsat, the trans-
* Ida R. Hoos, Systems Analysis In Public Policy: A Cri­ 
tique, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1972.
** Abraham Maslow, The Psychology of Science: A Re- 
connaisance, Harper & Row, New York, 1966.
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fer is not, strictly speaking, that of technology, but of the 
know-how to use data derived from the satellite, the evalu­ 
ation process becomes even more attenuated. Economists 
who have wrestled with the problem of the value of informa­ 
tion in the abstract would certainly be baffled if they had to 
identify dollar benefits from data that we are just learning to 
use and whose potential is nowhere near realization. The true 
value of better management of resources may not be fully 
appreciated in this century. But this should not demean the 
effort.
On the other hand, the "productivity urge" imposed by cost/ 
benefit strictures has encouraged the tendency to over-rate 
the trivial, because it can be seen and counted. The net effect 
reminds one of the metaphor about the mountain which 
labored and gave birth to a mouse. Highly-placed committees 
and high-level conferences concentrate on the small what's 
rather than the big how's. Emphasis on product is, in some 
ways, a diversionary tactic, for it limits focus to technical 
considerations. Thus, we invariably find technical people 
talking to technical people, with the "user community" a 
shadowy entity somewhere far out in the real world. The 
process of transfer attracts far less attention than its import­ 
ance and its complexity warrant. Moreover, because activities 
related to transfer do not fit the standard management 
model, they run the risk of being undervalued, swept under 
the fiscal rug, or lost in the organizational maze. Thus, 
NASA's considerable contribution to solar photovoltaic tech­ 
nology, with exciting applications in rural areas of this 
country and of less developed countries, do not get counted 
even though they represent the essence of intergovernment 
cooperation, linking NASA with the Department of Energy 
and the Agency for International Development, and the 
quintessence of user-oriented transfer activity. Funding has 
to be found through "creative bookkeeping", because al­ 
though costs can be counted, benefits, by their very nature,, 
remain incalculable. Already adversely affected by over- 
zealous application of the "Space Age management tech­ 
niques" that made cost/benefit analysis a prime requirement 
in the federal budgetary process, NASA finds its technology 
transfer efforts handicapped because of the way state and 
local agencies have embraced the methodology. They, too, 
operate in a now-oriented environment. The exigencies of the 
moment cause them to welcome only specific technologies 
identified as relevant to their current problems. And if an 
innovation is not immediately and visibly cost/effective, it 
is likely to encounter many road blocks, especially in an era 
of Proposition 13 thinking. Where we are dealing with 
remote-sensing, effectiveness of which depends mainly on 
the astuteness and sophistication with which the data it can 
yield are used, there are probably more potent impeding 
than implementing factors in the cost/benefit balance. 
William L. Kahrl, as Director of Research, Governor's Office 
of Planning & Research, State of California, sets forth the 
criteria in no uncertain terms:
For California . . .the problem of achieving ongoing 
applications of Landsat technology involves not the
adoption of a system but a conversion of our existing 
systems. For this purpose, it is probably not sufficient 
that the technology is economical; it must be inexpensive 
enough to justify trashing another system. It is not 
sufficent that the technology is useful; it must be unique­ 
ly so. It is not sufficient that the technology is simply 
efficient; it must be better than what we are already.*
The business community has its own agenda. Thomas J.
Kelley**, vice-president of Grumman Aerospace Corporation
puts industry's position succinctly:
. . .our approach, quite simply, has been to try to develop 
products that somebody would buy -- for money -- and 
that would thereby generate a profit.
Interesting to note, the item Mr. Kelley chose as an illus­ 
tration was one that was a result of serendipity. "'We got into 
technology transfer with the product shown in Figure I [an 
aluminum canoe] before we even knew what technology 
transfer wajs." (Italics added). Although his catalogue of 
applications was varied, none of the products in the con­ 
sumer market had yet brought substantial return on invest­ 
ment. But he expressed optimism***'
We keep hoping that if we look hard enough, we'll event­ 
ually find products that we can truly make some money 
on and, at the same time, help out the public sector.
Industry, understandably, is in business for itself; its role in 
technology transfer may, however, be understated by the 
apparent end-product emphasis. Many companies have 
applied aerospace technology to new processes and methods 
that improve productivity and products. Contributions like 
these may be of enormous value socially and economically 
but the measuring instruments we use in our drunkard's 
search**** for highly visible yield cause us to ignore them.
* William L. Kahrl, as Director of Research, Governor's 
Office of Planning & Research, State of California, "Over­ 
view of California's Approach to a Statewide Remote Sensing 
Program," Address deliver to the National Conference of 
State Legislatures Remote Sensing Workshop, Cal-Neva 
Lodge, Lake Tahoe, November 8, 1977, p.4.
** Thomas J. Kelley, "An Aerospace Technology Devel­ 
oper's Perspective," Aerospace Technology Transfer to the 
Public Sector, AIAA-NASA Workshop Conference, Crystal 
City, Virginia, November 9-11, 1977, Proceedings, New 
York, American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 
June, 1978, pp. 20-21.
*** Ibid., p. 25.
**** Abraham Kaplan ("The Conduct of Inquiry," San 
Francisco, Chandler, 1964, page 11,) recounts the story of a 
drunkard hunting under a lamppost for keys he has dropped 
some distance away. When asked why he didn't look there, 
his reply was, "It's lighter here".
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Because Landsat supplies a picture in full living color of the 
social dimensions of technology transfer, it serves as a useful 
case in point. Encountered first off is the difficulty of defini­ 
tion: Landsat is not being transferred anywhere; it stays in 
orbit. Nor, strictly speaking, will there be a transfer of remote- 
sensing technology. Called for in the current White House 
Fact Sheet on U.S. Civil Space Policy is selective utilization, 
NASA having been changed to "emphasize space applications 
that will bring important benefits to an understanding of 
earth resource, climate, weather, pollution, and agricul­ 
ture . . . ." for"all classes of users/' But here official language 
obscures the reality. "Applications" cannot "bring important 
benefits," and "understanding of earth resources" does not 
automatically improve husbandry. The human links that are 
crucial to every stage of the process of making Landsat 
accessible so that it may be applied usefully are not official­ 
ly adknowledged. Thus not only is the look-Ma-no-hands 
notion perpetuated, but also an inappropriately normative 
objective imposed, viz. delivery of "important benefits." 
Whether there will be benefits, and whether the benefits 
will be important depend on many factors, political and 
economic in nature. These are intrinsic to a vast social ex­ 
periment, a learning process, that is just occurring.
Much that has been going on with respect to Landsat, there­ 
fore, has been an exploration of the ways in which remote 
sensing can, or can be made to, yield the kind of data that 
would be useful in the management of natural resources. 
That this complex process is trussed and truncated for man­ 
agement purposes to fit into a slot called Technology Trans­ 
fer on an organizational chart is due more to the vicissitudes 
and vagaries of bureaucratic nomenclature than to NASAs 
philosophy. The net result is, nonetheless, to subject this 
highly complex process to conditions which are intrinsical­ 
ly unsuitable.
Landsat not being merely a hardware concept, its ultimate 
success or failure must rest not on what it does so much as 
what others do with the data it can gather. Accessibility is a 
key factor here. In fact, Michael J. McCormick,* who partici­ 
pated actively in and has prepared a thoughtful review of the 
Pacific Northwest's Land Resource Inventory Demonstration 
Project, stresses the point:
Delays and uncertainty in obtaining data through the data 
dissemination system have often precluded [their] use.
But other agencies besides NASA are involved. The U.S. 
Geological Survey, for example, has responsibility, through 
its EROS (Earth Resources Observation Systems) program, 
for acquiring, processing, distribution, and applying remotely- 
sensed data to earth resources and environmental matters. 
Hence, EROS figures significantly in Landsat's progress as an
* Michael J. McCormick, 'The Pacific Northwest Regional 
Commission's Land Resource Inventory Demonstration 
Project — The User's Experience," AIAA/NASA Conference 
on "Smart" Sensors, Hampton, Virginia, Nov. 14-16, 1978.
ongoing and ready source of data. However, the EROS 
contribution depends neither on its internal capability nor 
on its service to users but on the way the budget-makers view 
the EROS mission. Thus, unless the data-distribution link is 
supported by policy and funds, Landsat cannot possibly 
"bring important results."
Moreover, NASA is no monolith; within its organizational 
structure, there are philosophical differences that affect 
Landsat applications programs. How responsibilities are con­ 
strued and allocated profoundly influences the way in which 
transfer is effectuated. The reciprocal interplay of conceptual 
and personnel changes has, over time, had a marked impact 
on programmatic approaches. To be sure, remote sensing user 
development has always been a basic objective, and the pro­ 
cess appears to have been developmental with the current 
ASVT (Applications System Verification.and Transfer Pro­ 
gram) the culmination.
Three regional Program Centers, designated to serve as the 
principal contacts for state and local governments in their 
area, act as technical middle-men. Dr. Anthony Calio, Asso­ 
ciate Administrator for Space and Terrestrial Applications, 
described the Program as follows:
The objective of the regional Remote Sensing Appli­ 
cations Program is to systematically transfer, primarily 
to state and local governments, the ability to effectively 
use Landsat data for their resource management and 
planning decisons.*
Obviously, each of the Regional Centers interprets its man­ 
date in its own particular ways. It is a reflection of the man­ 
ager's personality and style rather than a manifestation of set 
rules. How the differences among the Regional Centers may 
ultimately affect the reception and utilization of Landsat's 
data is another matter.** Only time and some measurement 
instrument more sensitive than a bean-counter will tell. 
Certainly, "service" cannot be rated in terms of numbers 
of "show-and-tell" presentation:, nor success be calculated 
by volume of inquiries. Right now, the ASVT Program shows 
promise of fostering a somewhat more functionally coordin­ 
ated approach to Landsat data usage. But, as we have so 
often seen, reports may look better than the reality.
* Anthony J. Calio, Statement before the Subcommittee of 
Space Science and Applications, Committee on Science and 
Technology, U.S. House of Representatives, p. 7, June 27, 
1978.
** Having been privileged to observe at first hand only with 
the Ames Research Center, I can cite it as worthy of honor­ 
able mention. The resiliency that has somehow eluded organ­ 
izational ossification, the commitment to the ideal of tech­ 
nical service to the public and not merely technical program 
packaging -- these are prime manifestations of the philosophy 
prevailing among Western Regional Programs managers. 
Working with them has reinforced for me the importance of 
the human side of this effort.
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Lost as I am in the grooves of academe, I may not be able to 
see the trees in proper perspective. But not to mention the 
role of the educational institutions of the country in the on­ 
going saga of Landsat would be to omit an important, and 
curiously controversial, dimension. In some circles, the un­ 
iversities have been viewed as sponges, absorbing much but 
producing little. In the eternal scramble for funding, university 
faculty have been accused of pursuing their own high-flying 
interests. At the AIAA meetings of November, 1977,explicit 
criticism of NASA for over-reliance on universities was the 
springboard for advancing the use of other channels as trans­ 
fer agents. To be sure, the typical professor's Gradus ad 
Parnassum within his citadel is probably not "in synch" with 
the technical exigencies of remote-sensing. But there are very 
important functions that are properly within the university 
bailiwick -- the testing of technical improvements, new uses 
for Landsat, new methods of analysis of Landsat data, for 
example. The acrimonious debate over whether training or 
education is the proper objective for an institution of higher 
learning goes on. Nevertheless, the basic role and function 
of the universities* vis-a-vis transfer of technology and of 
remote sensing in particular are indisputable. Even though 
preoccupation in some sectors with application has generated 
a kind of impatience for the slower-paced, longer-horizoned 
research and education aspects, they are nonetheless valu­ 
able. The grumbling that NASAs past support of university 
programs was a "failure" and that future funds should go to 
"doers" is a manifestation of misunderstanding. In fact, 
assessment of "failure" may be more a matter of partial 
perspective than of impartial truth. Without the reservoir 
of university research to draw on, remote sensing technology 
could not have attained its present state of applicability. 
Work still goes on to test out new technical improvements, 
new uses, new methods of analysis. University-based special­ 
ists provide needed support services to ongoing projects. 
Sometimes obscured in the smoke of battle has been the 
contribution of the universities of this and other countries 
to the advance of remote sensing. Not the least of this has 
been the leadership thus developed. NASA-supported pro­ 
jects at the universities of the world were, are, and will 
continue to be a major source of skilled and often-inspired 
manpower, a resource that defies quantification. Remote 
sensing still draws its main impetus and direction from an 
array of talent directly linked to the universities. In the 
words of Dr. John De Noyer**:
The prime role for the universities is one of research and 
teaching. These are so very vital that the whole effort 
would not last long without them. But time and patience 
are essential; we need to go through a whole generation of 
students before we can expect to have a cadre of trained 
people."
* I use the term loosely to include all academic institutions 
of higher learning.
** Dr. John De Noyer, Research Geo-Physicist, Geologic 
Division, U. S. Geologic Survey, informal remarks at ISETAP 
meeting, April 6 & 7, 1978.
Private sector involvement in the Landsat application process 
is a matter of earnest policy, endorsed by a kind of intuitive 
faith that industry could, under certain conditions, derive 
benefit from and act as a constituency for Landsat. This be­ 
lief is evidenced in a kind of ritual ballet that takes the form 
of periodic meetings at which NASA affirms its determina­ 
tion to have private industry share the bounty and booty 
of remote sensing and industry airs its grievances over the 
frustrations of dealing with the federal government. Promi­ 
nent among the latter are the regulations, the Code of Feder­ 
al Regulations now running to some 70,000 pages. In an area 
as sensitive as that of the proprietorship of information and 
of software, "total disclosure" edicts constitute a roadblock. 
In fact, as one observer puts it/ "Some businesses find the 
simplest solution to be the cop-out."
Another problem stems from federal paperwork require­ 
ments. "In some industries, heads of research and develop­ 
ment report that they spend more manhours filling out 
government requests and reports than in doing the research 
itself, and that these requirements are smothering the very 
initiative and innovation whose decline the President la­ 
ments."
While there is no denying the validity of these complaints, 
neither is there any gainsaying the need, from the official 
point of view, of (a) regulations and (b) accountability. 
These are matters neither new nor exclusive to Landsat. In 
spite of them Landsat seems to be generating considerable 
industry activity, listed by Tuyahov** as follows: major 
aerospace firms; firms producing digital image analysis 
systems and/or providing image analysis services; firms pro­ 
viding remote-sensing analytical services (including scientific 
discipline consultation); firms providing geo-referenced in­ 
formation systems and/or service; firms producing equip­ 
ment related to remote sensing (digitizers, scanners, etc.), 
firms providing remote-sensing data acquisition services; not- 
for-profit organizations; firms providing training services; and 
financial investment analysis organizations.
Just how and how much Landsat contributes to the Gross 
National Product cannot even be guess-timated. The more, in 
fact, that it does, the less likely are we to know the exact 
details.
Landsat data are a tool in the operations of private mining 
and petrochemical companies. According to authoritative 
opinion, they also figure prominently in the multi-million- 
dollar crop forecasting business.*** But figures on market-
* Leo-Arthur Kelmenson, "Whatever Happened to U.S. 
Innovation?" The New York Times, February 4, 1979.
** Alex -Tuyahov, "Industrial Initiative," Conference for 
Suppliers of Remote Sensing, Springfield, Virginia, October 
19-20, 1978.
*** Aviation Week and Space Technology, October 17, 
1977, p. 61.
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ability and profitability, essential in attracting industry in­ 
volvement, are lacking. Where government subsidy is pro­ 
posed as an incentive, questions arise as to how much and for 
how long. Even more basic are questions relating to the ulti­ 
mate role of the private sector in satellite technology. Should 
private corporations go into business for themselves, e.L, 
launch their own vehicles, own and distribute data for a 
fee, convert the data and sell them according tg their own 
rulebook? Particularly serious policy questions can be 
raised about the propriety of restricting, by price or other 
means, open access to data acquired by satellite systems built 
with tax dollars. Sticky questions arise about acquisition of 
data from satellites launched by foreign countries whose 
regulations and restrictions may be different from those 
imposed by the U.S. Answers here become serious issues, 
colliding head-on with implications in the international 
sphere, as well as in arenas relating to invasion of privacy* 
and freedom of information.
There are many paradoxes in the industry position. Some 
spokesmen argue for subsidy, with the public good as the 
goal and airlines and agriculture as the analog. Others protest 
government participation on the ground that technical ser­ 
vices and training activities constitute unfair competition. 
Active government involvement is required, some claim, 
because industry has not demonstrated the will to move 
forward vigorously and because little progress would have 
been made had not government taken a leadership role. Im­ 
plicit in much of the debate has been the value at end-use 
point of the satellite-derived information. And here more 
questions are raised: Who are the users? How are they best 
served? Who ultimately benefits from remote-sensing tech­ 
nology? Embedded here are basic policy matters, at the 
cross-roads between politics, economics, and social justice. 
Papered over by pious references to "industry-government 
interfaces/' "cooperative federalism," and the like, they 
nonetheless will continue to exist, not only with respect to 
space - but to all technology transfer in which the American 
public has a stake.
The four-letter word most used in connection with Landsat, 
but the one least understood, is user. Thus, although NASA 
has geared programs to users, has concentrated on user de­ 
velopment, and, as in the Pacific Northwest Land Resource 
Inventory Demonstration Project, takes pride in user-driven 
applications, there is no satisfactory definition to fit all cat­ 
egories of user. Heterogeneous, diffuse, and dispered at 
different levels and points in the dissemination process, 
users might be the technical middlemen providing service to 
oil prospectors, middle managers charged with making supply 
forecasts in a water agency, or Hoopa Tribal Council elders 
concerned with their hunting and fishing rights. Or they 
might be a fellow federal agency like the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture seeking to update crop forecasting services.
At the risk of conducting a drunkard's search, we will focus 
attention on state and local governments (1) because they
* Many people are worried about "the spy in the sky."
come closest to approaching homogeneity; (2) they share, to 
a degree, perspectives and problems; and (3) we know more 
about them as users actual or potential, of Landsat.* Landsat 
use by state, regional, and local agencies has been tabulated, 
surveyed, analyzed, and documented enough so that the 
numbers need not occupy us here. Suffice it to say that, in 
general, an appropriate maxim would be, "Familiarity breeds 
attempt," for the charts show a participation growth on the 
part of states from 3 in 1974 to 35 in 1978, with similar 
trends for resources agencies. There is, notwithstanding the 
upward curves on charts, reason to believe that states would 
be more receptive to Landsat if they had the technical cap­ 
ability to use its data. The ISETAP (Intergovernmental 
Science, Engineering and Technology Advisory Panel) ob­ 
serves:** "States need more than raw data in order to utilize 
Landsat .... They need technical assistance to develop an 
initial Landsat capability and continuing assistance to stay 
abreast of technological development and improvements/' 
This may be construed as a cogent argument for a concerted 
technology transfer effort on the part of the federal govern­ 
ment, something which has been seen as neglected in the 
"disproportionate balance of attention to the satellite."
Redefinition of Landsat to signify a data delivery system 
might direct official attention to problems that have under­ 
mined its usefulness and seriously impeded the transfer pro­ 
cess. States generally report inadequate coordination within 
the data-delivery system as particularly troublesome. Re­ 
flected here is the need for synchronization of activity on the 
part of the two federal agencies and of elements within at 
least one of them, viz. the U.S. Geological Survey. State and 
local resource agencies, fragmented in function and often 
criticized for it, are quick to advise the federal government to 
"get their act together." But even while complaining about 
duplication and requesting better coordination, states voice 
considerable reservation about "centralization" and its 
implications for the democratic process. Not only with re­ 
spect to Landsat but prevailing in most programs linking 
federal with state and local government is concern about 
ultimate control. Moreover, as indicated in a General A- 
ccounting Office Report***, state and local officials like 
industry spokesmen evince reluctance to become involved 
with federal agencies because of the red tape, i.e. the paper­ 
work, and the regulations associated with technical assist­ 
ance. Here, then, we reach an impasse: while heavy federal 
presence seems to be necessary in bringing Landsat to the 
local scene, it does not occur free of encumbrance. The re-
* Hence, they are the drunkard's keys under the streetlamp.
Intergovernmental Science, Engineering and Technology 
Advisory Panel (ISETAP), Natural Resources and Environ­ 
ment Task Force, OSTP, State and Local Government on a 
Landsat Information System, June, 1978, pp. 18-19.
U.S. General Accounting Office, State and Local Gov­ 
ernments' Views on Technical Assistance, GGD-78-58, 
July 12, 1978, p.ii.
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lationship between federal and state levels has more love- 
hate than equal-partnership characteristics. It is also apparent 
that institutional arrangements for the "cooperative fed­ 
eralism" have yet to be achieved. The Pacific Northwest 
Project offers some interesting possibilities, but success may 
have been due to novelty. It remains to be seen whether the 
PNW Project can be institutionalized -- or can survive that 
ossifying process.
There is, indeed, a body of research that supports the hy­ 
pothesis that the financial and technical resources provided 
by federal programs relate only tangentially to adoption and 
implementation of innovation by state and local govern­ 
ments.* Contrary to the familiar notion that local and state 
bodies are backward, inherently uninnovative, and incapable 
of appreciating the apple-pie of technical programs served up 
by the federal government, the claim has been made** that 
local public officials are behaving rationally, in view of the 
problems they face and the social conditions in which they 
exist. Some of these impinge directly on Landsat's reception 
and are, therefore, worth mentioning in this context. There 
is, first and foremost, the boomerang effect of the oversell 
of management information systems in general. The disillu­ 
sionment stemming from almost ten decades of big invest­ 
ment in and small return from such efforts inspired a city 
planner in St. Louis to deliver an incisive paper whose title 
conveys its message: "Urban Planning Information Systems -- 
Name One That Works!"*** Kindelberger points to short­ 
ages of money, sophistication, sustained data collection cap­ 
ability, and political support as deterrents to information 
systems' usefulness. A detriment less recognized but a valid 
caveat is presented as follows:
... in addition to being unable to produce certain plan­ 
ning data, information systems have a second shortcoming 
in their very real potential for providing meaningless or
* R.K. Yin, et al, A Review of Case Studies of Technological 
Innovations in State and Local Services, Santa Monica, The 
Rand Corporation, R-1870-NSF, February, 1976, Final 
Report on National Science Foundation Grant RDA 75- 
04134
** Paul J. Flynn (Research Associate at Syracuse Research 
Corporation) and W. Henbambright (Professor of Political 
Science and Public Administration Maxwell School of 
Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University and 
Director of the Science & Technology Policy Center, Syra­ 
cuse Research Corporation), "Helping the Cities: Are the 
Feds Taking the Easy Way?" Urban Technology, November, 
1978, pp. 18-23.
*** Charles P. Kindleberger, III (then Chief, Governmental 
Assistance Division, St. Louis County Department of Plan­ 
ning), "Urban Planning Information Systems - Name One 
That Works!" Submitted for presentation at CB/NASA.
**** Charles P. Kindleberger, III, op. cit., p.4.
false data. Unfortunately, by wrapping such information 
in the glitter of computer printout, the ease with which it 
is recognized as junk, and rejected, may be impaired.
His conclusion is nonetheless forward-looking and useful 
when we consider Landsat from the viewpoint of state and 
local users:*
The relative importance of hard data, and rigorous sys­ 
tems analysis may have declined for planning, in compar­ 
ison with an appreciation for values, intuition, and the 
potential process; just as, with demise of the "McNamara 
approach" it has in other aspects of American society.** 
Yet the need for current inventories of land use, dwelling 
units, land characteristics, and many other data series 
remains fundamental to the successful performance of the 
professions. (Emphasis added).
A problem fundamental to applications occurs because 
"state-of-the-art" technology is constrained by the state of 
other arts. State and local users, lacking the financial and 
technical means to undertake the research and adaptation 
activities, or to revise and update their resource information 
models, can take only limited, if any, advantage. There is, as 
was pointed out earlier in this paper, the need to justify 
innovation by visible cost-effectiveness. With state and local 
officials under pressure to reduce the costs of government 
and lower taxes, priority may be given to immediate and visi­ 
ble physical improvements, such as a new fire station, rather 
than the less tangible, longer range returns from better plan­ 
ning. A serious deterrent to the fullest exploration of any 
technology's potential is the current management style, 
which requires at all levels an evaluation, patently premature, 
of its cost-effectiveness. To say that cost is the cart put be­ 
fore the technical horse is to express a basic problem. Most 
users of Landsat data cannot yet assess their value, which lies 
in the uses to which they are put. How well Landsat tech­ 
nology is utilized will depend on factors unrelated to the 
inherent potential of the technology and related quite direct­ 
ly to the activities supporting the transfer process.
Perhaps, knowing this, we can now arrive at a socially mean­ 
ingful definition of Technology Transfer: the dissemination 
of and assistance in making beneficial use of technological 
advances. This implies a real-life flow diagram, with all the 
program elements attuned in a holistic plan, structured to 
involve the entire community and responsive to the longterm 
needs of the society.
* Ibid.
** For a critique, see p. 3 of this paper and Ida R. Hoos, 
Systems Analysis in Public Policy: A Critique.
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